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1 Introduction
Asset-pricing models make assumptions about how information arrives and
is disclosed to its investors (henceforth the market). For assets arising out
of a productive activity by a firm, management reports based on internal
audits of the various accounting numbers (accounting variables), prepared
in time for the scheduled (publicly pre-specified) dates, are one such source.
If, by the nature of their activity, management make more frequent audits
(for instance in directing replenishment to a specific level, which enforces
frequent stock-taking, as in the retail business), then opportunities arise for
‘early’ (unscheduled) disclosure. How should this additional information be
used to signal the firm’s superior value, i.e. to upgrade its share-price? When
(or how) should the market ‘price in’ the absence of early disclosures by a firm
to include the possibility that no news is bad news. The answer must rely on
an equilibrium between the market’s ability to down-grade the share-price
and the firm’s ability to take advantage of ignorance: hiding some bad news
within the uncertain cause of absent news, i.e. censoring the information.
The accounting literature has usually approached this question by includ-
ing a specified (i.e. known in advance), single, ‘additional’ interim reporting
date, ahead of the next scheduled disclosure, and allowing for absence of an
early disclosure by randomizing the possibility that management has held an
additional audit – see [Dye], [JunK]. However, with the early date a datum,
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this approach places limits on comparative analysis; for an equally spaced
multi-period model see [EinZ].
1.1 Earnings guidance: strategic considerations
In this the companion paper to [GieO] we propose an alternative general
approach, by instilling more realism into the stylized Black-Scholes model of
[GieO]. There the market determination of the (share-)price of the firms in
a sector reflects only the discretional information strategically released by a
firm (i.e. with anticipation of its price effect), usually in the form of earn-
ings guidance, as below, at a stochastic time-point (i.e. at unknown dates in
advance of a subsequent mandatory date of information disclosure). Despite
this highly specific origin for the arrival of information in the market, that
model holds considerable advantages, thanks to its continuous-time approach
which overcomes the limitations of the traditional ‘two-period analysis’ just
mentioned. There unspecified moments in time offer an early disclosure. By
way of an example from [GieO], which goes beyond the scope intended here,
there is a derivable ‘band-wagon’ effect whereby the introduction of multi-
ple sources of information reduces an individual firm’s optimal frequency of
disclosures by reference to time left to the next mandatory disclosure date.
Typically, however, the market responds also to other public sources of
information, such as trading in the shares of the firm, and by assessing the
exposure of the firm to such economic risks as may be priced by market-
quoted options.
Here we create a more general framework to include such other, already
existing, market-based information enabling the market to make proper use
of this additional information about the firm. This prompts a deeper analy-
sis, equivalently a formalization at a foundational level, of the various mech-
anisms at work, offered in the Complements Section. For simplicity, we
consider here only the situation where the market’s concern is for a single
firm, rather than a whole sector. In this we are guided by the clarifying sim-
plifications that occur in the case of an isolated (‘single’) firm in the stylized
model [GieO].
There the firm itself comes to know (‘observes’) its own state Vt only
at discrete, stochastically generated times t, not known to the market; the
manager, occupied by a variety of tasks, cannot receive observations except
when these breach agreed thresholds, as reported by personnel delegated
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to collect this information, perhaps continuously. This feature of a hidden
observation scheme enables the firm to bury (hide) ‘bad’ news and only report
‘sufficiently good’ news, principally because the manager cannot at any time
credibly claim as absent an observation at that time. That model prices the
firm in periods of silence, i.e. when the firm fails to supply an early report
of information. Key to this is identifying at each time t a value Lt such that
if Lt happened to coincide with the true and currently observed state Vt,
the firm would be indifferent, as regards its market valuation (i.e. given the
market’s information ex ante), between choosing to disclose or to withhold
the current observed state Vt. Such an indifference level Lt, determined by the
information available from before time t, is typically unique. Censoring, i.e.
suppression of an observation below this unique Lt, draws from the market a
valuation of the firm at Lt. In fact, Lt is the largest possible valuation of the
firm, consistent with the information available from before time t. As such
it is termed the optimal censor of time t. Note that observations above Lt
that are disclosed cause an upward jump in the firm’s valuation. We should
emphasize that only truthful disclosures are allowed in the model.
The mathematical argument is based on risk-neutral valuation, which
must incorporate the potential future re-evaluations of firm-value consequent
upon future early disclosures.
The existence of an indifference pricing process is directly attributable
to the firm knowing the market’s filtration F ∗ = {F∗t }t and the mechan-
ics of how the market performs computations based on past disclosures (in
particular, the probabilities at each instant which the market attaches to
the firm suppressing an observation of its state). Since the firm’s filtration
F = {Ft}t is an enlargement of F ∗ [Jeu], in that the firm feeds the market
with information by choosing when to supply its private observations, one
may say that the firm emulates (can simulate) the market. In turn the mar-
ket’s calculations are based on the firm’s algorithm, though not on the firm’s
up-to-date observations. The indifference price arises from characterizing a
notional parametric equilibrium between the two agents: the firm and the
market (we do not differentiate between informed and noisy traders), select-
ing parameters in the computation they use to second-guess each other.
The paper identifies the mechanisms underlying some fairly general val-
uation procedures, allowing the market to form its beliefs from additional
information and the firm to exploit the market beliefs by disclosing value
superior to that belief, but nevertheless to give a fair view of future dis-
closures. As these mechanisms are inspired by the principal argument and
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findings of [GieO], we close here with a summary of that argument (in the
simplified notation used below). Suppose the next mandatory disclosure is
at the terminal time 1 and that, under the market’s risk-neutral measure
Q, at time t < 1 the probability of a disclosure to the market occurring at
time T ∈ (t, 1] is τT . (In [GieO] opportunities to observe the state of the
firm are generated by a Poisson clock.) Based on its information at time T ,
the earnings guidance announced at that time by the firm gives its target
terminal value as V T = EQ[V1|FT ]; the target and the two filtrations above
are related to the indifference level LT of time T by the two equations
(1.1.1a) V T = τTE
Q[V1|VT ≥ LT ,FT ] + (1− τT )LT ,
(1.1.1b) LT = E
Q[V1|NDT (LT ),F∗T ].
Here NDT (L) is the event that no disclosure occurs at time T, which means
that either there has been no opportunity to observe VT or else the manager
has observed VT but VT ≤ L. From here, in the context of [GieO], given how
F∗T is generated from FT via F∗T -measurable decisions, one deduces in the
limit as T → t from (1.1.1a) that t 7→ Lt satisfies a simple ordinary differ-
ential equation (involving the instantaneous variance of Q and the Poisson
clock’s intensity). Assuming multiplicative scalability, that VT+u = VT V˜u
with independence of VT and V˜u, equations (1.1.1a,b) can be further simpli-
fied.
In summary, apart from simplifications, this paper’s contributions in-
clude: announcements of both sufficiently good and sufficiently bad news
(dual, ‘materiality’ aspects in the release of private information), incorpora-
tion of current public information in modelling market sentiment, and com-
parative statics of early disclosures.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a preliminary dis-
cussion of our modelling aims. Section 3 models the market’s beliefs as to
firm value, based on expected performance indices and is supported by a
geometric Brownian (GMB) implementation. This is followed in Section 4
by a model of the firm setting its target values; using a benchmark scheme
to be followed by the firm in observing its own state, this is shown at its sim-
plest to be similar to determining option exercise values, and is supported
by an indicative GMB implementation. This enables us to perform compar-
ative statics in Section 5, which we conclude meets a primary objective: to
show how parameter values determine early or delayed voluntary release of
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information in equilibrium. We comment briefly on the implications of our
approach in Section 6, thus rounding off the paper’s contribution, and close
in Section 7 with Complements indicating a framework for generalizations
and potential variations. An Appendix gives details of well-known GMB
formulas needed in the paper.
2 Model preliminaries
In this section we introduce a model of how a firm F decides to disclose
information intermittently at times t to the market M about its state Vt,
voluntarily between legally mandated (mandatory) disclosure dates. This
involves modelling how the market forms beliefs V ∗t in periods of silence
about the true current value Vt. (We regard the market as dual to the firm,
hence the ‘star’ notation here and below.)
Our first two tasks are: to model the beliefs of M (in §3) and then to
model F ’s choice of ‘equilibrium’ indifference level (in §4), below which an
observation of Vt, if any, is not disclosed (as in the Introduction). We will
rely on tractable Black-Scholes frameworks, and in the second task we will
be guided by the findings of [GieO]. In §5 we prove the existence of these
indifference levels in a benchmark context. We may then pass to calculations
which will yield conclusions, in particular, about the likelihood of early dis-
closure. This enables us in §6 to address comparative statics of voluntary
(i.e. early) disclosures, matters beyond the reach of [GieO].
Thereafter, we discuss generalizations identifying potential for more so-
phisticated models (e.g. inclusion of analyst forecasts).
The firm has ‘private’ access, according to some observation scheme – pos-
sibly also intermittent – to its ‘state’ Vt (thought of as the income stream).
This is modelled as a random time τ not known to M. The firm applies fixed
decision rules by which it determines at time t whether to withhold any obser-
vation it may have, or to disclose its information voluntarily (and truthfully)
to the market via two items of information: (i) the current value Vt, and (ii)
the expected state at the terminal date, i.e. the next mandatory disclosure
date. We term the former the declared current value V C and the latter its
declared target value V T (current as at the date of its disclosure). The firm’s
intention is to achieve the highest possible market valuation at each point in
time; here this is implemented by use of a fixed decision rule, based both on
its own private information about its state and on the market’s public belief
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about the state of the firm, which in turn depends on the market’s infor-
mation base. We term this, publicly held belief about the value, the market
sentiment. F forms its expectations by reference to a measure QV T (labelled
by the last declared target) under which its (discounted) observation process
is a martingale.
To model market sentiment, we borrow and amend a concept from con-
trol theory, that of a state observer (a.k.a. ‘state estimator’) system; for a
discussion see §7.1(iv).
In the [GieO] model the observation scheme was a Poisson clock with
known jump intensity; the market sentiment was an equilibrium valuation
obtained from the latest disclosed state-value, prudently discounted down-
wards (i.e. by incorporating the possible undisclosed poor performance);
discounting is by a rate determined by the (known) Poisson jump intensity.
Below, the market sentiment V ∗t is based on the latest disclosed infor-
mation and on the current value, or perhaps on the prevailing behaviour, of
some specified portfolio of traded assets with value S∗t (e.g. current value,
average value, record value to date). The portfolio, termed the tracker, is
viewed by the market as capturing the firm’s exposure to quotable (market-
priced) risks. The key property of S∗t is that it is priced by a risk-neutral
(i.e. market) measure. That is, M forms its expectations by reference to
a measure Q∗ under which the (discounted) tracker process is a martingale.
We note that, at each time t, since F has access to M ’s information F∗t plus
its own observation, i.e. its own filtration {Ft}t is an enlargement of {F∗t }t,
Q∗| F∗t = QV T | F∗t .
As in [GieO], so too here, the link between market sentiment V ∗ and asset
S∗ needs to be determined by equilibrium considerations: if at time t the firm
applies a decision rule h to the observations of S∗ and V , it will determine
an indifference level L (as in the Introduction) which, if F observed that
Vt = L, would make F indifferent between disclosure or otherwise of Vt.
While the firm determines its disclosure using a rule h (below) that exploits
any superiority of the observed value over market sentiment, rather than its
expected terminal value, it complements such a disclosure by supplying the
market with information about the expected terminal value.
We take the decision rules for F and consequently also forM (with starred
notation for the latter’s rules) in the (time-independent) form
(2.0.1) hε,a(t, x, y) = (x− (1+a)y)ε, (x, y ∈ R, t > 0)
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where a > −1 is termed a mark-up, and ε = ±1 its signature, positive when
deciding a good-news disclosure event at time u, say, when
(2.0.1a) Vu ≥ (1+a)V ∗u ,
and respectively negative for a disclosure of bad-news. (A dynamic variant
is considered briefly in §7.1) These may be viewed as backed by a theoret-
ical justification for such a ‘principal-agent’ delegation (here a shareholder-
mandated policy): see the classic paper [BaiD, Prop. 1.4] for a rigorous
derivation of control limits, using an ‘evaluation and control’ method. The
argument there refers to the costs versus the benefits of extracting informa-
tion and the authors claim support of (perhaps, anecdotal) hard evidence
that such rules are observed in practice.
We close by stressing that the various asset-price dynamics here are mod-
elled only between consecutive disclosures – in ‘periods of silence’.
3 Market sentiment: shadowing the firm
Our first task begins at a point in time T0 with 0 ≤ T0 ≤ 1 when the firm is
assumed to have disclosed two items of data: current state V C and declared
target V T.We use V T as a suffix conveniently labelling the various processes
started at time T0 .
The next time of disclosure, following access to an observation of XT at
time T = T+, will occur provided
h(T, VT , V
∗
T ) ≥ 0.
Here the firm F applies its decision rule h taken in general to depend on
the time-T values of V and V ∗, and perhaps on T itself, a possibility ruled
out below to simplify calculations (hence the rules in §2 above). Then at
time T = T+, the firm will declare its current state VT and set a new target
value V T = V T+. So the main tasks are to devise a justifiable model for a
process V ∗, which we view as ‘shadowing the firm’, and for V T+ (in the next
section).
3.1 Two modelling assumptions
We begin by identifying how to model V ∗t . This will be determined by two
components. Although the entire process is driven by a specified market
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portfolio S∗, the tracker, nevertheless, at each non-disclosure time-point t
in (T0, T1) a correction term needs to be included to price in the effects of
any possible future disclosure event, say of time τ . We thus aim for a two-
component model
(3.1.1) V ∗t = S
∗
t +∆V
∗
t ,
which requires that we model ∆V ∗t . The latter must refer to contingent
claims in regard to whether or not F has attained its target to date; with
h∗ a market decision rule, this requires pricing contingent claims on [t, τ ]
characterized by the instantaneous time-τ pay-off
(3.1.2) S∗τ1{h∗(τ ,S∗τ ,V T )≥0}, for τ = τV T .
So this is a ‘securitization’ similar to standard derivative instruments. It
depends on a ‘random time’ τ = τV T (with values in (t, T1]) unknown to
the agent M . Unfortunately, pricing these depends on individual investor
attitudes, so on micro level information, typically unobservable. The prag-
matic approach is to replace the pricing of these claims with approximations.
Assuming a constant risk-free rate r in force, we now make explicit a first
modelling assumption, that with τ = τV T
(3.1.3) ∆V ∗t := exp(−r(T1−t))EQ
∗
[S∗τ 1{h∗(τ ,S∗τ ,V T )≥0} | F∗t ]− S∗t ;
here Q∗ is an assumed risk-neutral measure conditional on market informa-
tion – conditional at time t on market information F∗t (with the expectation
on the right assumed meaningful). The formula identifies ∆V ∗t as the excess
over S∗t of the fair value of the effect of a disclosure occurring at time τ . The
final step at time t is to pass to an approximation, which make explicit a
second modelling assumption, that
(3.1.4) S∗τ 1{h∗(τ ,S∗τ ,V T )≥0} ≈ E∗t 1{h∗(t,Σ∗t,T1 ,V T )≥0}.
Here, on the one hand, Σ∗t,T1 is some chosen tracker-performance index over
the entire remaining time interval, for instance
(3.1.5abc)
Σ∗t,T1 = max{S∗u|u ∈ [t, T1]}, or
Σ∗t,T1 = 1/(T1 − t)
∫
[t,T1]
S∗u du, or
Σ∗t,T1 = min{S∗u|u ∈ [t, T1};


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and, on the other hand, a typical choice for E∗t is obtained by solving
h∗(t, E∗t , V T ) = 0. This last has a unique solution, the result of the simple
form of decision rule in §2 above. Thus in good-news situations E∗t identi-
fies a value at-least-as-good-as the true value S∗τ at disclosure; in bad-news
situations such an E∗t will be at-most-as-bad-as that. We summarize these
modelling considerations in:
Proposition 3.1 The two modelling assumptions (3.1.3), (3.1.4) imply
that
V ∗t = (S
∗
t +∆E
∗
t )Q
∗(h∗(t,Σ∗t,T1 , V T ) ≥ 0 | F∗t ) exp(−(T1−t)r) ,
where:
(i) S∗ is assumed to start with the value V C at time T0,
(ii) ∆E∗t = E
∗
t −S∗t , and
(iii) Σ∗t,T1 is chosen as in example (3.1.5) above.
3.2 A geometric Brownian implementation
On the firm side we take the firm’s observation process V to be modelled by
a geometric Brownian motion X :
(3.2.1) Xs+t = Xt exp((µV T − 12σ2V T )s+ σV TWV T,s), s ∈ [0, T−t];
here WV T is a Brownian motion independent of time-t information Ft, with
σV T > 0 and µV T ∈ R fixed.
Likewise, on the market side we adopt a Black-Scholes model with one
risky security S∗, so modelled again by a geometric Brownian motion, which
thus satisfies the requirements of Proposition 3.1 and carries several advan-
tages beside: firstly, model-completeness (see for example [MusR, Prop. 8.2.1,
p. 302] for the completeness of the multi-dimensional model) and, secondly,
the ability of being re-started with value V C at time T0. We take the dy-
namics in the form
(3.2.2) S∗t+u = S
∗
t exp(µ
∗u+ σ∗W ∗u ), u ∈ [0,∞)
with Brownian motion W ∗ independent of time-t information F∗t , and two
parameters: volatility σ∗ > 0 and drift µ∗ = r−δ−(1/2)σ∗2, for some δ ∈ R.
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This modelling choice ensures that the probabilities in the formula of
Proposition 3.1 are well-defined (see below), emerging as tail probabilities
for good-news decisions, since
h∗(t,Σ∗, V T ) ≥ 0 iff h+1,a∗(Σ∗, V T ) ≥ 0 iff Σ∗ ≥ (1+a∗)V T,
for Σ∗ any random variable. It is routine to derive explicit formulae for these,
see the next subsections. We focus here on the choices of (3.1.5a,c) of max-
and min-tracker-performance index Σ∗t,T1(S
∗), leaving aside the average value
index.
3.2.1 V ∗ from the running-max approximation
We first deal with the running-max
Σ∗ := max{S∗u | u ∈ [t, T1]}.
We note a reversion from bad-news to good-news decisions via:
Q∗(h+1,a∗(Σ∗, V T ) ≥ 0) +Q∗(h−1,a∗(Σ∗, V T ) > 0) = 1.
The actual influence of the second term on the first is determined by the
relative size of (1+a∗)V T and S∗t , so according to the sign of
(3.2.3) A∗ = log((1+a∗)V T/S∗t ).
Below Erfc is the complementary error function, for which see subsection A2
of the Appendix. Equations (A.7a) and (A.7b) in the Appendix yield the
following results.
Proposition 3.2 If A∗ < 0, equivalently, S∗t > (1+a
∗)V T , then
Q∗(h−1,a∗(Σ∗, V T ) > 0) = 0,
and there is no ‘bad-news’ influence; thus
(3.2.4a) Q∗(h+1,a∗(Σ∗, V T ) ≥ 0) = 1 , if S∗t ≥ (1 + a∗)V T.
If A∗ ≥ 0, equivalently S∗t ≤ (1+a∗)V T , then ‘bad-news’ carries influence
measured by
(3.2.4b) Q∗(h+1,a∗(Σ∗, V T ) ≥ 0) = 1−Q∗(h−1,a∗(Σ∗, V T ) > 0),
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where
(3.2.4c) Q∗(h−1,a∗(Σ∗, V T ) ≥ 0) =
=
1
2
Erfc
(
A∗t − (T − t)µ∗
σ∗
√
2(T − t)
)
+
1
2
exp
(
2µ∗A∗t
(σ∗)2
)
Erfc
(
A∗t + (T − t)µ∗
σ∗
√
2(T − t)
)
.
To complete the picture, note that the bad news scenario when Σ∗ is the
running-maximum can be read back from:
(3.2.5) Q∗(h−1,a∗(Σ∗, V T ) ≥ 0) = 0 , if S∗t > (1 + a∗)V T,
and that for A∗ > 0 this probability is given by equation (3.2.4c) above.
3.2.2 V ∗ from the running-min approximation
We now deal with running-min
Σ∗ := min{S∗u | u ∈ [t, T1]}.
The good-news and bad-news formulas hold good and, viewed technically,
may be derived by replacing µ∗ by −µ∗ and A∗ by −A∗ = log(S∗t /((1+
a∗)V T )); and switching to probabilities complementary to those in (3.2.1):
see the discussion for equation (A8) in Section A2 of the Appendix. From
there, we have explicitly:
Proposition 3.3 If S∗t ≤ (1+a∗)V T, then
(3.2.6a) Q∗(h+1,a∗(min{S∗u | u ∈ [t, T1]}, V T ) ≥ 0) = 0,
(3.2.6b) Q∗(h−1,a∗(min{S∗u | u ∈ [t, T1]}, V T ) ≥ 0) = 1.
If S∗t > (1+a
∗)V T, then
(3.2.6c) Q∗(h+1,a∗(min{S∗u | u ∈ [t, T1]}, V T ) ≥ 0)
= 1−Q∗(h−1,a∗(min{S∗u | u ∈ [t, T1]}, V T ) > 0),
where
(3.2.6d) Q∗(h−1,a∗(min{S∗u | u ∈ [t, T1]}, V T ) ≥ 0) =
=
1
2
Erfc
(
A∗t − (T − t)µ∗
σ∗
√
2(T − t)
)
− 1
2
exp
(
2µ∗A∗t
(σ∗)2
)
Erfc
(
−A
∗
t + (T − t)µ∗
σ∗
√
2(T − t)
)
.
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4 Setting new targets
The previous section determined how the firm triggers disclosure by reference
to a fixed decision rule h and a model of market sentiment V ∗t (our proxy
for an observer-system of control theory). This replaces and simplifies the
dynamics of the equilibrium approach of [GieO], but comes at the cost of
losing information about the expected terminal firm-value (value at the next
mandatory disclosure date). The model of [GieO] identifies that expected
‘terminal value’ as equal to the disclosed value. The modelling in the cur-
rent section provides the missing information in the form of a new target
value V T+ (so ‘plugs’ the gap between the models). The framework here
is, nevertheless, inspired by the equilibrium argument in [GieO], as summa-
rized by the concept of an indifference level (see equations (1.1.1a,b) in the
Introduction).
If the firm were to use a threshold L to trigger disclosure at some, for
the moment arbitrary, future time moment u in (t, T ], the firm’s adopted
decision rule, h say, determines disclosure iff hV T,u(u,Xu, L) ≥ 0. As only
truthful disclosures are assumed, this entails a market valuation at the dis-
closed level. However, absence of a disclosure entails, for some appropriately
selected threshold L, as in the model of [GieO], a valuation of L. In sum-
mary, if L = L(u) = Lu is selected appropriately for time u, then the time u
valuation of the firm is given by the random variable
(4.0.1a) ZV T,u(Lu) = Xu 1{hV T,u(u,Xu,L(u))≥0} + L1{hV T,u(u,Xu,L(u))<0}.
Now let τV T be a random time, with the interpretation that the event
τV T (u) = u for u > 0 means that F observes Xu, the complementary event
being τV T (u) = 0.
We now modify the random variables in (4.0.1a) by taking into account
the times of observation and non-observation and define
(4.0.1b) ZτV TV T,u(Lu) = ZV T,u(L) 1{τV T (u)=u} + L1{τV T (u)=0}.
Then the expected valuation is∫
(t,T ]
EQV T [ZτV TV T,u(Lu) | Ft ] τV T (du),
denoting here the distribution of τV T by τV T again, for notational conve-
nience. As in §1.1 (cf. [GieO]), since QV T is risk-neutral, this should agree
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with Xt. Without loss of generality to the analysis of the interval (t, T ], we
may agree to resize (rescale) the observation process at time t to unity. Inter-
preting the values as discounted to present time t, our modelling assumption
is to seek a constant L = LV T solving
(4.0.2) 1 =
∫
[t,T ]
EQV T [ZτV TV T,u(LV T ) | Ft ] τV T (du).
In setting the new target level, this formula relies not on the market filtration
F∗ (so not on future market sentiment), but on fair value computed from the
larger filtration F with which the firm is equipped.
Granted the existence of a solution to (4.0.2), a matter addressed in §4.2
below, we take V T+ := Lu to correspond to hV T,u.
4.1 A bench-mark observation scheme
For a tractable implementation of the modelling assumption in formula (4.0.2),
we replace the random observation scheme τ by a deterministic one, known
only to the firm but most certainly not known to the market. This permits
a decomposition
(4.1.1) [t, T ] = CV T ∪ DV T ∪ NV T
according as observation extends over continuous intervals, or either at a
finite number of (discrete) time moments, or not at all.
Then the equation above reduces to
1 =
∫
CV T
EQV T [ZτV TV T,u(Lu) | Ft ]
du
T − t
(4.1.2) +
∑
u∈DV T
EQV T [ZτV TV T,u(Lu) | Ft ] qV T
+
(
1− vol(CV T )
T − t
)
LV T
with qV T = 1/#DV T , effectively the constant probability of discrete moni-
toring.
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Furthermore, taking hV T,u to be hε,aV T,u (with a mark-up aV T,u > −1)
leads to a decomposition of the variable ZV T,u into an option part and a non-
option part, appropriately corresponding to good-news and bad-news events.
For the good-news case (ε = +1), it can readily be checked that this is
(4.1.3a) ZV T,u(L) = L+max{Xu−(1+aV T,u)L, 0}+aV T,uL1{Xu≥(1+aV T,u)L},
and similarly for bad-news (ε = −1) :
(4.1.3b) ZV T,u(L) = L−max{(1+aV T,u)L−Xu, 0}+aV T,uL1{Xu≤(1+aV T,u)L}.
So the ‘optionality’ in ZV T,u(L) reduces to a plain vanilla option corrected by
a digital option. Turning to the practicalities of options, one way to handle
positions in digital options is to approximate them by plain vanilla positions
using a selection of slightly amended strikes. From this perspective, the
optionality of ZV T,u(L) can be regarded as approximately induced by a plain
vanilla call- (respectively put-) option with strikes close to (1+aV T,u)L. In
view of its broader role we refer to LV T as the optimal censor (cf. §1.1).
Proposition 4.1 (Optimal censor optionality): When aV T,u = 0 for
all u, with the additional assumption of only discrete observations (CV T = ∅),
the equation (4.1.2) for the optimal censoring thresholds specializes for the
good-news event to
(4.1.4a) 1 = 2LV T + qV T
∑
u∈DV T
EQV T [max{Xu − LV T , 0} | Ft ],
and for bad-news
(4.1.4b) 1 = 2LV T − qV T
∑
u∈DV T
EQV T [max{LV T −Xu, 0} | Ft ].
4.2 Existence of LV T for the benchmark observation
scheme
This section demonstrates the existence of a target value V T+ := LV T for the
benchmark observation scheme of the preceding subsection as characterized
by equation (4.1.2). The existence theorems splits into two cases according as
the decision rule determines good- or bad-news announcements; in both cases
we analyze the functional form on the right of equation (4.1.2), treating LV T
as a free variable, now denoted by L. It is convenient to begin with bad-news
announcements.
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4.2.1 Bad-news case
The final term in equation (4.1.2), corresponding to non-monitoring, has a
simple functional form: it is linear in L. To understand the other contribu-
tions, we rewrite the equation in a form which reflects the complementary
conditioning in the two summands of the earlier equation (4.0.1b). This gives
rise below to two corresponding functions of L and recasts the characteriza-
tion of LV T in the form:
(4.2.1a) 1 = NV T (LV T ) + BSV T,1(LV T ) + BSV T,2(LV T ).
The three functions appearing here are defined as follows:
(4.2.1b) NV T (L) =
(
1− vol(CV T )
T − t
)
L,
BSV T,1(L) =
∫
CV T
EQV T [Xu1{Xu≤(1+aV T,u)L} | Ft ]
du
T − t
(4.2.1c) + qV T
∑
u∈DV T
EQV T [Xu1{Xu≤(1+aV T,u)L} | Ft ],
BSV T,2(L)/L =
∫
CV T
EQV T [1{Xu>(1+aV T,u)L} | Ft ]
du
T − t
(4.2.1d) + qV T
∑
u∈DV T
EQV T [1{Xu>(1+aV T,u)L} | Ft ]
(with ‘B for bad news’ and ‘S for Black-Scholes’). The relation between
their behaviour and consequent existence of a target value is captured in the
following result.
Proposition 4.2 In bad-news events, for a constant LV T to exist for
which equation (4.2.1a) holds, the following conditions (1) to (4) are suf-
ficient.
(1) BSV T,1(L) and BSV T,2 are continuous maps on [0,∞).
(2) BSV T,1(∞) > −∞.
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(3) vol(CV T ) 6= T−t, or BSV T,2 is unbounded.
(4) 1 ≥ BSV T,1(0).
Proof. First consider the behaviour of the function summands as L grows
large. In BSV T,1(L) the indicator-functions for large L will become those of
the entire space, i.e. the constant function 1; the summands of BSV T,1(L)
should thereby become expressible in terms of the first moments of X as
follows:
(4.2.1c)∞
BSV T,1(L)(∞) =
∫
CV T
EQV T [Xu | Ft ] du
T−t + qV T
∑
u∈DV T
EQV T [Xu | Ft ].
Little can be said about the behaviour for large L of BSV T,2(L) except for
its being non-negative for L non-negative. As a consequence,
NV T (L) + BSV T,1(L) + BSV T,2(L) ≥ NV T (L) + BSV T,1(L) ,
for any L ≥ 0. On inspection from (4.2.1b), the right hand side of this
inequality will grow linearly in L arbitrarily provided vol(CV T )/(T−t) 6= 1.
Situations where vol(CV T ) = T−t amount to monitoring X at all points in
time in [t, T ] except perhaps on an infinite sequence of points; this is contrary
to the spirit of this paper’s observation schemes τV T , and so little will be lost
in excluding such schemes. A minor problem arises, when BSV T,1(∞) = −∞.
Also, granting this technicality, the above line of reasoning gives conditions
of unboundedness to the right (one is able to make the right-hand side of
the inequality (4.2.1a) bigger than any given real by choosing L sufficiently
large); in particular, in the same way, it gives conditions for making the
right-hand side bigger than 1.
Assume the functions are continuous in L. An application of the intermediate-
value theorem will then establish the existence of LV T provided there is a
value of L for which the right-hand side of (4.2.1a) is smaller than 1. There
may be no way other than to postulate this, and it is most sensible to do so
for the smallest value L can take, namely 0.
4.2.2 Good-news case
We proceed similarly in this case, rewriting the characterizing equation again
so as to reflect the relevant conditioning in (4.0.1). The difference here is that
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now a reversal of inequalities in the passage from bad- to good-news decisions
requires corresponding new function definitions (below). These, alongside the
term NV T (L) from (4.2.1b), recast the existence problem to solving for LV T
the equation
(4.2.2a) 1 = NV T (LV T ) + GSV T,1(LV T ) + GSV T,2(LV T ).
Here (with ‘G for good news’) we define:
GSV T,1(L) =
∫
CV T
EQV T [Xu1{Xu≥(1+aV T,u)L} | Ft ]
du
T − t
(4.2.2b) + qV T
∑
u∈DV T
EQV T [Xu1{Xu≥(1+aV T,u)L} | Ft ],
GSV T,2(L)/L =
∫
CV T
EQV T [1{Xu<(1+aV T,u)L} | Ft ]
du
T − t
(4.2.2c) + qV T
∑
u∈DV T
EQV T [1{Xu<(1+aV T,u)L} | Ft ].
Their behaviour and consequent relation to the existence of a target value is
again captured by a result analogous to Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.3 In good-news events, for a constant LV T to exist for
which equation (4.2.6a) holds, the two conditions (i) and (ii) below are suffi-
cient.
(i) GSV T,1 and GSV T,2 are continuous maps on [0,∞).
(ii) 1 ≥ GSV T,1(0).
Proof. Mutatis mutandis, the line of reasoning developed for Proposition 4.2
now applies. Here, the larger L is, the closer the indicator functions in
GSV T,2(L) will come to the indicator function of the entire space; this trans-
lates into GSV T,2(L) becoming similar to some real GSV T,2(∞) as L grows
large, and this real is positive. Since GSV T,1(L) ≥ 0 for every L ≥ 0, the line
of reasoning of Section 4.2.1 now establishes without further conditions the
unboundedness in L of the right-hand side of (4.2.6a).
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4.2.3 Worked Example in the Geometric Brownian case
Corresponding to the mark-up decision rules of (2.0.1) there are six expecta-
tions appearing in the formulas of section §4.2.1 and §4.2.2 that are needed
for an explicit determination of LV T . Assume that X follows geometric
Brownian motion:
Xt+s = Xt exp
(
(µV T −
1
2
σ2V T )s+ σV TWV T,s
)
s ∈ [0,∞),
with µV T ∈ R, σV T > 0, and WV T a standard Brownian motion indepen-
dent of time t information Ft as in (3.2.1). For fixed u = t+s in [t, T1],
these six expectations are provided by standard results on Brownian motion.
Corresponding to (4.2.1c)∞ one has
(4.2.3) EQV T [Xu | Ft ] = Xt exp(µV T s);
likewise, corresponding to the pair (4.2.1d), (4.2.6c) and the pair (4.2.1c),
(4.2.6b), taking
(4.2.4) ∆s :=
log((1 + aV T )L/Xt)− (µV T + 12σ2V T )s
σV T
,
one has respectively:
(4.2.5a) EQV T [1{Xu≥(1+aV T )V T} | Ft ] = 12Erfc
(
∆s/
√
2s
)
,
(4.2.5b) EQV T [1{Xu≤(1+aV T )V T} | Ft ] = 12Erfc
(−∆s/√2s) ,
(4.2.6a)EQV T [Xu1{Xu≥(1+aV T )V T} | Ft ] = 12Xt exp(µV T s)Erfc
(
∆s−σV T s√
2s
)
,
(4.2.6b)EQV T [Xu1{Xu≤(1+aV T )V T} | Ft ] = 12Xt exp(µV T s)Erfc
(
−∆s−σV T s√
2s
)
.
Here Erfc is again the complementary error function, for which specifically
see Appendix equations (A.7a, b) and (A.8).
For periods of continuous monitoring, integrals of these three expressions
need to be computed over time s. This is unproblematic for (4.2.2), where
it reduces to differencing of the right-hand side across the endpoints of the
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monitoring period (and division by µV T ). For (4.2.5ab) and (4.2.6ab) this will
lead to expressions in terms of non-standard special functions: the incomplete
Bessel functions, given by integrals of the form
∫
[t,T ] x
α exp(−(A/x2+B2x)) dx
for some real constants A, B ≥ 0 and α. Series representations can be derived
for these integrals; generically in α, the series are in terms of values of the
incomplete gamma function, namely
(4.2.7)
∫
[t,T ]
xα exp(−(A/x2 +B2x))dx =
= (B2)α+1
∑∞
m=0
(−1)m
m!
(B2)2m{Γ(−(α+m+1), B
T
)−Γ(−(α+m+1), B
t
)},
where the series may be expressed in terms of Erfc only for particular choices
of α (integer or half-integer values).
5 Comparative statics of early disclosure
Here we address matters on which [GieO] is silent.
5.1 General performance index Σ
Theorem 5.1 With the modelling assumptions of Section 3.1, the follow-
ing assertions hold in the framework of Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
(1) Time-T disclosure becomes the more likely the smaller are a∗ and V T .
(2) In good-news situations time-T disclosure is the more likely the smaller
is r and the bigger are a and E∗T .
(3) In bad-news situations, time-T disclosure is the more likely the bigger
is r and the smaller are a and E∗T .
Proof. Working in the general process situation of Sections 4.1 and 4.2,
the starting point here are the inequalities holding at any time T in (T0, T1]
which trigger a disclosure. In a good-news event this is
(5.1.1) VT ≥ (1 + a)e−r(T1−T )E∗TQ∗(Σ∗T,T1 ≥ (1 + a∗)V T |F∗T );
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and for bad-news this is
(5.1.2) VT ≤ (1 + a)e−r(T1−T )E∗T (1−Q∗(Σ∗T,T1 > (1 + a∗)V T |F∗T )).
Treating V T as a given (computed by the accounts department), the like-
lihood of the validity of these inequalities is determined by the size of the
respective right-hand side; the good-news event (5.1.1) occurring is the more
likely the bigger is the size of the expression on the right; the bad-news event
(5.1.2) becomes the more likely the smaller is the size of the right. The vari-
ables on which the validity of these inequalities depend are thus: a and V T ,
correspondingly a∗ and E∗T , the interest-rate r, the ‘time to maturity’ T1−T
(time left to the mandatory disclosure), and the variables beyond these that
enter into the construction of Σ∗T,T1 ; the latter variables include V C via S
∗
T .
Remark 5.2 The effects of S∗T and T1−T on a time-T disclosure decision
depend on the specific form of the law of Σ∗T,T1. To justify this assertion as
supplementary to Theorem 5.1, we look at the effects of infinitesimal changes
in S∗T and T1−T on the (right-hand sides of) (5.1.1) and (5.1.2). Granted
for simplicity the partial differentiability of these probabilities, we have the
following two equations in terms of λ∗T , the law of Σ
∗
T,T1
contingent on time-T
information F∗T :
(5.1.3) ∂T1−T [e
r(T−T1)Q∗(Σ∗T,T1 > (1 + a
∗)V T |F∗T )]
= er(T−T1)
∫ ∞
(1+a∗)V T
{∂T1−Tλ∗T − rλ∗T}(u) du,
(5.1.4)
∂S∗
T
[er(T−T1)Q∗(Σ∗T,T1 > (1 + a
∗)V T |F∗T )] = er(T−T1)
∫ ∞
(1+a∗)V T
∂S∗
T
λ∗T (u) du.
We see from these two equations that the signs of the effects depend on the
exact form of this law, and so need to be determined on a case by case basis.
Suffice it to say that conditions needing to be imposed here in concrete cases of
λ∗T include conditions that entail that no sign changes occur in the respective
integrands on the right-hand sides of these equations. To determine these
signs explicitly requires concrete choices, at the least for S∗ and for how
exactly S∗ enters into the definition of Σ∗T,T1.
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5.2 Comparative statics for changes in S∗
T
We show that the assumption that the process S∗ follows a Markov process
is sufficient for the determination of the effect of S∗T on early disclosure. So
we work with processes with two properties: firstly that, for any time u ≥ 0,
(5.2.1) S∗T0+u = S
∗
T0
exp(X∗u), where ST0 = V C ,
where (X∗u)u≥0 is a process independent of time-T0 information F∗T0 ; secondly
that, also for arbitrary T ∈ (T0, T1],
(5.2.2) S∗T+u = S
∗
T exp(X
∗
u) , u ∈ [0,∞),
where, by abuse of language, (X∗u)u≥0 (or a suitable version of the process in
(4.3.5) denoted by the same same symbol) is a process independent of time-T
information F∗T .
Theorem 5.3 We have ∂S∗
T
Q∗
(
Σ∗T,T1 > (1+a
∗)V T | F∗T
)
> 0 in (4.3.4)
under the additional Markovian conditions (5.2.1) and (5.2.2) on S∗; so in
both good-news and bad-news situations a time-T disclosure becomes the more
likely the larger is S∗T . This conclusion holds more generally for all construc-
tions of Σ∗T,T1 that preserve scaling (in the sense that we have Σ
∗
T,T1
(S∗) =
S∗TΣ
∗
T,T1
(exp(X∗)) ).
Proof. The assumption (5.2.1) and (5.2.2) imply that S∗ is the product
of a scaling factor S∗T and a ‘standardized version’ of S
∗. This yields a
representation for Σ∗T,T1(S
∗) as a product of two positive factors, the scaling
factor S∗T and the random variable that results from the application of the
respective construction for Σ∗T,T1 to the standardized version of S
∗.
In (5.1.1) and (5.1.2) the partials w.r.t. S∗T of the probability factors will
thus be positive so long as we have independence of the normalized versions
of S∗ from time T -information. 
5.3 Early disclosure for Geometric Brownian perfor-
mance indices
We consider here the other parameter mentioned in Remark 5.2 namely T1−T ,
i.e. the time left to the next mandatory reporting date. At first sight, one
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might expect a proposition asserting that the shorter is this time, the less
likely are decisions made for an early disclosure. However, on reflection, such
decisions may well depend on the actual evolution of the market capitaliza-
tion of the firm, and market forces may lead to changes in the size of this
capitalization forcing early disclosure also at dates comparatively close to the
mandatory date. Therefore, a discussion of the effects of T1−T needs to be
incorporated in a model framework that includes S∗.
Here we adopt a standard Black-Scholes modelling for S∗, and therefore
consider now the process X∗ in Section 5.2 as following scaled Brownian
motion with drift:
(5.3.1) X∗u = X
∗(µ∗, σ∗)u = µ∗u+ σ∗W ∗u , u ∈ [0,∞),
whereW ∗ is aQ∗-Brownian motion independent of time-T information started
with value 0 at time 0, with parameters σ∗ > 0 and µ∗ = r − ∆∗ −
(1/2)(σ∗)2 ∈ R. Recall the former parameter is a measure of market volatil-
ity, while r−∆∗ is the excess of the (riskless) short rate, r, over the dividend
rate of the firm ∆∗ as seen by the markets ; in the present context this differ-
ence should be viewed as an ‘appreciation rate’ for investments in F (again
as seen by the markets).
The four effects on V ∗ to consider now are those induced by changes in
T1−T and also in σ∗, r−∆∗, and r. These four will depend on which of good-
news or bad-news situations occurs; they enter via the market proxies, and
hence even a qualitative picture will depend on the concrete form of Σ∗T,T1 .
We focus on modelling Σ∗T,T1 as the running minimum or maximum of S
∗, as
in equations (3.1.5a) and (3.1.5c), specifically in the good-news situations,
so that by equation (5.1.1) we must consider the inequalities
(5.3.2) VT ≥ V ∗• • ∈ {max,min},
with
(5.3.3a) V ∗max := (1 + a)E
∗
T exp(−r(T1 − T ))Q∗max,
(5.3.3b) Q∗max := Q
∗( max
u∈[0,T1−T ]
{X∗(µ∗, σ∗)} > A∗T ),
(5.3.4a) V ∗min := (1 + a)E
∗
T exp(−r(T1 − T ))Q∗min,
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(5.3.4b) Q∗min := Q
∗( min
u∈[0,T1−T ]
{X∗(µ∗, σ∗)} > A∗T ),
where we set
(5.3.5) A∗T = log((1 + a
∗)V T/S∗T ).
5.3.1 Explicit results for geometric Brownian performance indices
We give a paradigm discussion of the effects of T1−T on the likelihood of
disclosure decisions, when for the good-news case of (5.3.2) the running max-
imum is used in the construction of market proxies according to (5.3.2a,b).
These effects turn out to depend on the sign of the mark-up parameter A∗T
as follows.
Theorem 5.4 In the framework of Section 5.3, assume a situation of
time-T non-disclosure of good news. Using the running maximum of S∗ in
the construction of the market proxy V ∗, the following two assertions are
equivalent.
(1) Early disclosure in [T, T1] is the more likely the nearer is T to T1.
(2) sign(∂T1−TV
∗
max) < 0.
Here the partial derivative in (2) depends on the sign of AT ; for A
∗
T ≤ 0
this is
∂T1−TV
∗
max = −rV ∗max,
while for A∗T ≥ 0 this is
∂T1−TV
∗
max = −rV ∗max + (1 + a)E∗T exp(−r(T1−T ))
A∗T exp(−η2)
σ∗
√
2pi(T1 − T )3
,
where η = (A∗T − (T1−T )µ∗)/σ∗
√
2(T1 − T ) .
To indicate the typical line of reasoning for results like this, start from
(5.3.2), observing that (in these good-news situations) disclosure decisions
at some fixed point in time T are the more likely the larger V ∗T is. The
effects of some parameter on the likelihood of early disclosure thus translate
into the determination of the corresponding partial derivative of V ∗T , and
so a determination of their qualitative effect reduces to a determination of
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the sign of these partials. Early disclosure thus becomes more likely the
larger the relevant parameter, provided the corresponding partial of V ∗T is
positive, and vice versa. The point of our choice of a geometric Brownian
framework is that explicit formulas for the probability factorsQ∗• are available
as standard results in Brownian motion; these are reviewed in Appendix A
below, with equations (A7a,b) pertinent for the present case of running-
maximum performance parameters. Establishing comparatice statics results
therefore reduces to straightforward partial differentiation of explicitly given
functions, albeit of some complexity. Theorem 5.3 collects the results when
the relevant parameter there is the time left to the next mandatory date.
Remark 5.5 Proceeding along the same lines in the same situation, one ob-
tains results similar to those of Theorem 5.3 concerning the effects of the
volatility σ∗, whereas the effects of r−∆∗ and r are unequivocally unidirec-
tional (with the signs of the pertinent partials being equal to minus that of
E∗T ). Provided E
∗
T > 0, early disclosure within (T, T1) is the more likely the
smaller are r−∆∗ and r.
5.3.2 Explicit results for running-min
Here we note only that if the market proxies are instead constructed using
the running minimum of S∗ analogues of Theorem 5.3 and Remark 5.5 again
hold and preserve all the conclusions above except for a sign reversal in A∗T .
This shows how derivation of the effects of T1−T on early disclosure requires
the specifics of a given model.
6 Managerial Implications
This paper’s approach to asset pricing allows the development of a richer ap-
preciation of how voluntary disclosure by firms can affect firm asset valuation
in equilibrium. Existing research has typically modelled voluntary disclosure
as the choice by firms to make additional voluntary (content) disclosures to
the market at fixed time points. As such this literature does not consider the
possibility that firms may choose not only what to disclose voluntarily but
also when to disclose. Thus voluntary disclosure has at least two dimensions:
content and timing. As existing models typically do not consider the latter di-
mension, they are not truly dynamic, and hence do not provide the necessary
24
building blocks to develop a realistic empirical model of (‘two dimensional’)
voluntary disclosure. Here we have explicitly modelled the joint content-
timing interaction, so enabling more realistic formal modelling of problems
faced by managers of firms: when private news is uncertain, how good does
that private news have to be before it is in the interests of the firm to issue
a voluntary disclosure. The other side of this coin is what materiality stan-
dard needs to be followed in managing the voluntary disclosure process. The
comparative statics derived in the preceding section permit an understanding
of how changes in parameter values may explain differences in equilibrium
behaviour between firms – some voluntarily releasing additional information
early, others not. This meets the challenge of modelling equilibrium asset-
pricing with endogenously determined voluntary disclosures, wherein both
the content and the timing of disclosures are rationally chosen, making delay
or early release of information in capital markets an equilibrium outcome.
7 Complements
We close with some observations about the potential of the approach above
especially with regard to variations on the themes presented and generaliza-
tions away from the Brownian framework followed above.
7.1 Mechanisms
Implicit in our development of a markets-based general modelling framework
was the need to pick apart the ‘who does what and how’ into ‘building bricks’,
and with these to build a variety of models. We implicitly identified five such
bricks, which in fact are best considered as mechanisms, to borrow a phrase
from economic theory. These are made explicit here so as to stress both the
sensitivity of a model to its assumptions and its adaptability to alternative
contexts.
Mechanism (i). Evolution rules. The perspective adopted above is rather
like that of a scientist designing experiments and subsequently observing out-
comes and evolution. Ingredients thus include design dynamics, start time
and observation times. Thus mechanisms (i) amounts to formal rules for en-
coding these three aspects. Real-life features mapped via such ‘experiments’
include informational interplay between economic agents and firm-to-market
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communications. See the summary in Section 7.5 for an explicit illustration
of how this can be further developed.
Mechanism (ii). Decision-rule strategies. The task here is to provide rules
for triggering ‘events’ (typically, public disclosure of privileged information),
and the idea is that these be the consequence of some ‘rule’, i.e. functional
relation, applied to some observation variables. At a technical level, this
mechanism thus amounts to the selection of functional relations subject to
the specification of observation variables. The mechanisms we adopted, start-
ing from Section 3, are motivated by the provision of approximations to
equilibrium-induced decision rules as derived in [GieO]. There they corre-
spond to ‘value-enhancement’ disclosures when observations are ‘sufficiently
high’. Whilst outside the scope of the present paper, the argument there may
be dualized to correspond to equilibrium-induced ‘value-erosion’ alerts when
observations are ‘sufficiently low’, with a resulting notion of endogeneous
‘materiality thresholds’. Such an understanding leads to the following
Conjecture 7.1 First-order approximation of equilibrium decision-rules
based on the notion of materiality yields decision-rules using functions taking
the form
hε,a(t , x , y) = (x−(1+at)y)εt
for some families of signs ε = (εt)t∈[T0,T1] and mark-ups a = (at)t∈[T0,T1], and
vice versa.
Mechanism (iii). Observation processes V . A further fundamental notion is
informational assymetry, the task being to construct a ‘variable’ (or perhaps
a vector) with two properties. Firstly, it is capable of observation over time
and is observed over time by the informationally privileged agents of what-
ever model is to be constructed (denoted by the symbol F , typifing firms);
secondly, the variable is at best partially observable by the remaining agents
(denoted by the symbol M).
As to observation variables, we focus on a portfolio view. Continuing
to think of F as a firm for a moment, F will not in general observe just
a single source of information to set a target, but a portfolio of these, say
(X1, . . . , Xn, . . . , XN). Formally, the chosen observation process X will be a
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function of the Xn; simple, but typical, functions are linear or multiplicative
forms in the Xn as given respectively by
X =
∑N
n=1
anXn, or X =
∏N
n=1
Xann ,
with suitable real weights an ∈ R.
Examples of two factor portfolio observation variables. In the paper,
V was interpreted as representing the value of the firm F , i.e. a process
internally observed by F . It is natural to complement it by a process that
encodes the external view of the firm’s value, such as provided by the the
firm’s market capitalization, S∗. Specializing to portfolios of additive type,
the associated observation variable may take the form
X = aV + bS∗,
for some a, b ∈ R. General structure of X apart, the modelling of V and S∗ is
far from straightforward, and Sections 7.2 to 7.4 below offer an amendment
to the simplified treatment given in the main body of the paper.
Mechanism (iv). Observation process proxies V ∗ from state observer systems.
The task here is to enable specifically the ‘informationally under-privileged’
agents in the models to approximate V . To paraphrase a key idea in the
paper: here S∗ is seen as a public proxy for V in creating an estimate V ∗t of
Vt; for tractability we made specific approximation assumptions.
In so doing, we borrowed an idea from the control theory of an engineering
plant, where one way to deal with imperfect information about the plant
is to build a laboratory version (a model) of the plant with accessible full-
information of its state at any time (known as a ‘state observer’ system [Rus,
Ch. 3], [Son, Ch. 7] – in reality a ‘state estimator’); state-correcting signals
are sent to this model, using plant-based, imperfect, or partial observations,
with which to guide the ‘observer system’ (model) into greater agreement
with the plant.
Unlike in the engineering context, inclusion into a market-based model of
an observer-style system implies changes to the strategic behaviour of the firm
in its decisions to hide certain observations of its state. Indeed, here each side
(each of the agents, F or M) enriches its algorithmic opportunities. In this
context, our version of an ‘observer system’ responds to strategic behaviour,
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so is far richer. To emphasize this difference when, for example, F was a
firm, the observer-style system was termed a proxy-firm.
Mechanism (v). Target value processes V T . Under this heading, the task
is to provide techniques for forecasting values of observation variables (and,
significantly, of their proxies), bearing in mind that such items are contingent
on market developments as well as on restrictions arising from (production)
technologies. In Section 4 we marry accounting analysis with the analysis
of Bermudean options: mechanism (v) involved observation levels Lt for Vt
qua strike prices at which the respective agent’s decision rule is indifferent
between disclosing or suppressing private observation of Vt, were Vt to take
the value Lt (as noted in the introduction). This construction borrows from
the stylized model of [GieO], where these levels describe the market’s current
view of the value during periods of silence and so provide the basis of current
guidance on its earnings target.
7.2 Modelling firm-value processes: uncertainty struc-
ture of profits
As to the observation mechanism, one may ‘drill down’ to the basic structure
of profits and address the uncertainty effects created by reporting lags. The
starting point is a formalization of accounting practice: Vu the firm F ’s time-
u value is the accrual of an instantaneous variable piw over the period [T0, u]
added to an initially given value V C of time T0, so that
(7.2.1) Vu = V C +
∫
[T0,u]
piw dw, u ∈ [T0, T1],
implicitly assuming w 7→ piw to be summable over [T0, T1].
The simplest interpretation of Vu is incrementing V C by the firm’s actual
profit flow rate piw – as it actually arises at each time moment w between
time-T0 and time-u. Alternatively, to allow for the possibility of delays in
reporting profits (due, say, to reporting delays of costs, as below), we can
re-interpret this as the recognized profit flow rate – namely, the value posted
in some official ledger.
To introduce reporting lags into the model, fix Λ ≥ 0 and then at each
time u, assume the flow piw is certain only for ‘distant’ times w, namely times
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earlier than u−Λ, but for times w nearer to u, i.e. in (u−Λ, u], piw is uncertain.
A further refinement then occurs in the decomposition (7.2.1) created by a
deterministic part ∆nsVu , certain at time-u (with ‘ns’ for non-stochastic),
and a part ∆sVu uncertain at time-u:
(7.2.2a) Vu = V C +∆
nsVu +∆
sVu, u ∈ [T0, T1],
where
(7.2.2b) ∆nsVu =
∫
[T0,max{T0,u−Λ}]
piw dw,
(7.2.2c) ∆sVu =
∫
[max{T0,u−Λ},u]
piw dw.
We view V nsu = V C+∆
nsVu as an accounting equality, namely, as data held,
or stored, by the firm F , and ∆sVu as a variable that needs to be modelled.
Two obvious questions arise: first, how does (a manager) F respond to
such operational uncertainty. For example, will there be a period in which
F is waiting for the time-T accounting information to be corroborated and
to be verified as reliable (up to a level of security deemed appropriate for the
decision-making), and how does F then respond to the evolution of market
sentiment during such periods of waiting? Second, is there a correlation
between market sentiment V ∗ and the degree of operational effectiveness of
the firm’s accounting department?
7.3 Modelling firm-value processes: Cobb-Douglas ex-
amples
As a second complement to our discussion of Mechanisms (iii), we provide
examples for modelling firm-value observation processes V concretely.
7.3.1 (i) Deterministic
Here the construction of V needs to be linked to the standard functional
forms preferred by the theory of the firm in Economics and Econometrics.
We consider Cobb-Douglas technologies, and indicate how to model prof-
its derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function ([Var, Ch. 1], [Rom,
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Ch. 2]) corresponding to a single output from two input factors (such as
capital and labour) with respective parameters a, b ≥ 0 satisfying a+b < 1.
This yields profits as a function of input prices w = (w1, w2) and output
selling-price p in the form
(7.3.1) piCD(p, w) =
= p1/(1−(a+b))
{( a+b
κ · c(w)
)(a+b)/(1−(a+b))
− κ · c(w)
( a+b
κ · c(w)
)1/(1−(a+b))}
,
for a cost function c(w) = (wa1w
b
2)
1/(a+b), where
κ := ((a/b)a/(a+b) + (a/b)−(a/(a+b))/A1/(a+b), with A = (1−a)a−1/aa.
7.3.2 (ii) Stochastic Cobb-Douglas profits
To take into account uncertainties in the profit function, assume that uncer-
tainty in the output and input price is given by positive stochastic processes
on some stochastic basis, say X (Q) = (Ω,F ,F = (Fu)u∈[T0,T1], Q). As re-
gards output, passing to logarithmic prices and so to an exponential price
process expY , (7.2.1) yields profits of the form
(7.3.2) piw = α exp(Yw)
β = exp(α(log(α) + βYw) , w ∈ [T0, T1] ,
for some fixed α > 0, β ∈ R, and some fixed stochastic process Y on X (Q). In
turn this gives the uncertain part of the time-u value of V the representation:
(7.3.3) ∆sVu = α
∫
[max{T0,u−Λ},u]
exp(βYw) dw, u ∈ [T0, T1] .
Treating input (factor) prices w in similar vein preserves this general form
for the uncertain parts of V in (7.2.2c). In any of these representations, a
notable choice for Y is Brownian motion on X (Q), and this provides an
explicit illustration of how the modelling above turns Vu itself into a random
variable, given the time-u information (see Section 7.4 for scalable processes,
which we suggest as candidate modelling mechanisms).
As mentioned, accruals in (7.2.1) can be modelled in (at least) two con-
ceptually different ways, depending on whether instantaneous profits pis or
their accumulated value is taken as a primary variable. The matter of choice
is not just a conceptual but also a practical one, even assuming the clas-
sical Cobb-Douglas two-factor production technology above. Neoclassical
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economic theory asserts (cf. §3.3, [Rom] and [Var]) the profits of the firm
will then be a function of factor prices w1, w2 and of the commodity price p
taking the form
(7.3.4a) piCD(p, w1, w2) = w
a/(a+b−1)
1 w
b/(a+b−1)
2 p
(a+b−1) ·
·
{(a+b
κ
)(a+b)/(1−(a+b))
− κ
(a+b
κ
)1/(1−(a+b))}
,
with constants a, b > 0 such that a+b < 1 for
(7.3.4b) κ := ((a/b)b/(a+b) + (a/b)−a/(a+b))/((1−a)a−1/aa)1/(a+b) .
Assume that non-deterministic profits are the result of fluctuations in any
of these prices, and, for simplicity, staying within the Brownian framework,
assume the fluctuations follow geometric Brownian motion. The resulting
dynamic for piCD is of the form
(7.3.5) piCD,T+u = piCD,T exp(µpiu+ σpiWpi,u) , u ∈ [0,∞) ,
with driver a Brownian motionWpi independent of time-T information FFF,T
and with real constants σpi > 0 and µpi. Return now to the choice of explicit
modelling variants; according to the choice of accumulated profits or instan-
taneous profits, one has respectively
(7.3.6a) pis = piCD,T+s, s ∈ [0,∞) ,
(7.3.6b)
∫
[T,T+s]
piw dw = piCD,T+s, s ∈ [0,∞) .
This last requires for VT+u the integral of geometric Brownian motion, not
covered by the context of Section 4. For the first, the results of Section 4.2
do apply, and provide the forecast target V T .
7.4 Scalable processes
As a third complement to Section 7.1, we suggest the use scalable processes
for modelling with mechanisms. These processes will be patterned after the
exponentials of strong Markov processes S∗, which satisfy two equations.
Firstly, with T0 fixed, for any time u ≥ 0,
(7.4.1) S∗T0+u = S
∗
T0
exp(X∗u), where ST0 = V C ,
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where (X∗u)u≥0 is independent of time-T0 information F∗T0. Secondly, for
arbitrary real T in (T0, T1], the representation
(7.4.2) S∗T+u = S
∗
T exp(X
∗
u) , u ∈ [0,∞),
where, by abuse of language, (X∗u)u≥0 (or a suitable version of the process in
(7.4.1) denoted by the same same symbol) is a process independent of time-T
information F∗T . We now relax the second condition and define processes S∗
to be scalable if they are RCLL and satisfy (7.4.1) and (7.4.2), except that
now (7.4.2) need not necessarily hold for all T in (T0, T1] and instead is to hold
necessarily for all T in some prespecified finite subset T of (T0, T1]. Here we
primarily think of T as containing the endpoints of benchmark observation
schemes along the lines of equation (4.1.1). Extending this notion of scalable
process to allow the sets T to have at most countably many stopping times
should not, however, pose problems.
7.5 Modelling with mechanisms: a summary vista
A characteristic feature of the mechanisms identified in Section 7.1 is that
they identify the economic agents solely in terms of how they act. In respec-
tively Sections 4 and 3, as it happens, the agents F posited by the mechanisms
in disclosure situations are indeed interpreted as acting like the manager of
the firm, and agentsM as acting like representative market participants. For
the wider guidance theme, however, specific market participants will also ‘act
out’ the role of agent F within some of the mechanisms. An outline follows.
To tell our guidance story we need to single out a distinguished group of
people from among the market participants M , whom we shall call analysts.
The typical representative member of this group being denoted by A, we
continue to denote representative market participants as agents M (as in
Section 3).
The guidance theme then starts at time t with the announcement by
manager F of the current accounting numbers of the firm: V C and its target
V T for the next official reporting date T . These numbers are processed by
M as in the disclosure theme, while now A is also assumed to make its own
computations. For these computations A will be asumed to use mechanism
(v) of Section 7.1 (as though in the role of agent F ), and make its own
computions of the time-T target, possibly based on a re-estimation of V ,
V ∗, S and S∗; call the result V TA, and assume that A will announce this
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number to M and F at a time t+∆A within [t, T ]. This announcement will
possibly induce a re-calibration of the price processes S and S∗; the analyst’s
target V TA will now be added as a new variable in the decision making
of the manager F . Apart from a possible consequent re-calibration of V ∗,
the essential difference from the set-up of Section 3 is that now manager
F is assumed to use decision rules in four variables, say h(T, VT , VT ∗, V TA).
For present outline purposes, we will not make this 4-variable rule explicit,
leaving the details to be established elsewhere. Now running the disclosure-
mechanisms of Sections 3, 4, and 5 results, mutatis mutandis, in either an
early disclosure at some time τ < T , or a regular one at time T . In both
cases an announcement is made by manager F of new current numbers V C
and targets V T for the next reporting date; these numbers will be announced
simultaneously to the analysts A and to the market (as represented by agent
M) and the entire activity starts all over again. The details are intended to
be established elsewhere.
Appendix: Reductions
This section collects the simplifications arising for general mark-up decision
rules in Brownian contexts. We work with a fixed probability space (Ω,F , P )
which is equipped with a filtration F = (Fu)u≥0 such that the resulting
stochastic basis X (P ) = (Ω,F ,F, P ) satisfies the usual conditions (see for
example [JacS, Def. 1.3, p. 2]). The mark-up decision rules are assumed, as
above, in the form hε,a(x, y) = ε(x−(1+a)y), for fixed parameters ε = ±1
and a > −1.
A.1 Bad-news to good-news reductions:
For Σ a random variable on Ω, measurable with respect to Ft, and fixed
t > 0,
(A.0a) EP [1{h+1,a(Σ,V T )≥0} | Ft] = P ({Σ ≥ (1 + a)V T}| Ft),
(A.0b) EP [1{h−1,a(Σ,V T )≥0} | Ft] = 1− P ({Σ ≥ (1 + a)V T}| Ft).
These two yield a reduction of bad-news to good-news disclosures via
(A.1) EP [1{h−1,a(Σ,V T )≥0} | Ft] = 1− EP [1{h+1,a(Σ,V T )≥0} | Ft)] ,
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granted absence of point-masses in Σ over (1+a)V T , given the continuous
processes in play here. Note the qualitative consequence that factors influ-
encing the relevant probabilities will have opposite effects on good-news and
bad-news events; an increase in a factor that leads to an increase of (A.0a)
will decrease (A.1) and vice versa.
A.2 Running-minimum to running-maximum reduc-
tions:
We collect here the further reductions needed for good-news events when
S∗ is a geometric Brownian motion. With Σ∗ = Σ∗t,T1 the running maximum
or the running minimum of S∗ on some fixed time interval [t, T1], let W ∗ be
an (F, P )-Brownian motion on X (P ) started at 0 at time 0; for σ∗ > 0 take
(A.2) S∗u+t = S
∗
t exp(µ
∗u+σ∗W ∗u ), u ∈ [0,∞),
with µ∗ = r−δ− 1
2
(σ∗)2 for r, δ ∈ R; appealing to the strong Markov property
of Brownian motion, assume also W ∗ to be independent of Ft, and express
the events in terms of W ∗ as follows:
(A.3) EP [1{h+1,a(max{S∗w|w∈[t,T ]})≥0} | Ft] = P ( max
u∈[0,T−t]
{µ∗u+ σ∗W ∗u} ≥ A∗t ),
(A.4) EP [1{h−1,a(min{S∗w|w∈[t,T ]})≥0} | Ft] = P ( min
u∈[0,T−t]
{µ∗u+ σ∗W ∗u} ≤ A∗t ),
with
(A5) A∗T := log((1 + a
∗)V T/S∗t ).
Setting W ∗∗ := −W ∗ note that
(A6) P ( min
u∈[0,T−t]
{µ∗u+σ∗W ∗u} ≤ A∗t ) = P ( max
u∈[0,T−t]
{−µ∗u+σ∗W ∗∗u } ≥ −A∗t ).
It is special to the Brownian context that (A.6) provides a reduction of
the running-minimum event in (A.4) to a running-maximum event in (A.3),
since, if W ∗ is Brownian, then so is its negative W ∗∗ (above). An explicit
determination of the expectation (A.3) can be had from the explicit law
for the running-maximum of Brownian motion; see e.g. [Fre, (30) Corollary,
p. 25]. This relies, in this Brownian context, on the running-maximum always
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being positive on time intervals of positive length; indeed, this follows from
the fact that the running-maximum of the process is zero on non-positive
time arguments. This is not directly of use here, since the drift µ∗ is in
general non-zero. But an appropriate Girsanov transformation applied to
the measure P will achieve a reduction to the zero-drift case (cf. [RogW, §
I.13, eqn. (13.9)]), at the cost, however, of an additional exponential factor
in (A.3):
(A7a) P ( max
u∈[0,T−t]
{µ∗u+ σ∗W ∗u} ≥ A∗t ) = 1,
unless A∗t > 0, in which case
(A7b) P (maxu∈[0,T−t]{µ∗u+ σ∗W ∗u} ≥ A∗t ) =
=
1
2
Erfc
(
A∗t − (T − t)µ∗
σ∗
√
2(T − t)
)
+
1
2
exp
(
2µ∗A∗t
(σ∗)2
)
Erfc
(
A∗t + (T − t)µ∗
σ∗
√
2(T − t)
)
,
with Erfc (z) := (2/
√
pi)
∫
[z,∞) exp(−w2) dw, for any complex z, the comple-
mentary error function. This result can be established, mutatis mutandis,
along the lines of [MusR, Lemma A.18.2, p. 617seq]); for a proof by a reduc-
tion to this result, start from the equality
P ( max
u∈[0,T−t]
{µ∗u+ σ∗W ∗u} ≥ A∗t ) = 1− P ( max
u∈[0,T−t]
{µ∗u+ σ∗W ∗u} ≤ A∗t );
on the right-hand side we have from [MusR, eq. (A.85)] the equality
P ( max
u∈[0,T−t]
{µ∗u+ σ∗W ∗u} ≤ A∗t ) =
= N
(
A∗t − (T − t)µ∗
σ∗
√
T − t
)
− exp
(
2
µ∗A∗t
(σ∗)2
)
N
(
−A
∗
t + (T − t)µ∗
σ∗
√
T − t
)
,
if A∗t ≥ 0, but otherwise this probability is 0; then successively use the
identities 1 = N(ξ) + N(−ξ) and N(ξ) = (1/2)Erfc(−ξ/√2) to arrive at
(A7a,b).
Formulas for the tails of the running-minimum expressions of (A.4) are
a consequence of (A.7a,b). For this start by passing to the complementary
probability
P ( min
u∈[0,T−t]
{µ∗u+ σ∗W ∗u} ≥ A∗t ) = 1− P ( min
u∈[0,T−t]
{µ∗u+ σ∗W ∗u} ≤ A∗t );
35
now use (A.6) to translate the right-hand side in terms of probabilities for
the running maximum, and apply (A.7a,b) to obtain
(A.8) P ( min
u∈[0,T−t]
{µ∗u+ σ∗W ∗u} ≥ A∗t ) =
=
1
2
Erfc
(
+
A∗t − (T − t)µ∗
σ∗
√
2(T − t)
)
− 1
2
exp
(
2µ∗A∗t
(σ∗)2
)
Erfc
(
−A
∗
t + (T − t)µ∗
σ∗
√
2(T − t)
)
,
unless A∗t ≥ 0, in which case the probability is equal to 0; to obtain the first
summand here use the identity 2 = Erfc(ξ)+Erfc(−ξ) with
ξ := (A∗t − (T − t)µ∗) /
(
σ∗
√
2(T − t)
)
.
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